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IN the first  half  of 1986  crude  oil prices fell to about  $12  a barrel,  back to 
their level of 1974  and, when adjusted  for changes in the general  price 
level, close to the real  oil price  that  prevailed  in 1973  just before  the first 
OPEC price increase. This paper reviews the 1986 oil price collapse, 
discusses why it came as a surprise,  and assesses what it means for oil 
prices in 1986-87 and  beyond. 
The first section of the balance  of the paper  presents an overview of 
the 1970-86 world  oil market:  price, demand  and supply  by region, and 
output  and revenue for OPEC. The next section reviews the record  of 
expert opinion since the first big price increases in 1973-74, paying 
special  attention  to the 1980-81 World  Oil  study  by the Energy  Modeling 
Forum  (EMF)  and  to the results  from  a series of polls of energy  analysts 
since 1981 by the International  Energy Workshop. The third section 
presents an explanation of the 1986 price collapse, together with a 
simulation  of the choices facing OPEC for 1986 and thereafter. The 
fourth  section examines  the question  of what  should  have been expected 
for 1985-86, going as far back as 1980.  Included  there are econometric 
estimates of oil demand  functions for the United States and five other 
countries  of the Organization  for Economic Cooperation  and Develop- 
ment  (OECD).  The paper  concludes  with a discussion  of the outlook  for 
the world  oil market. 
The conclusions of the paper are briefly as follows. The 1986  price 
collapse was the result of a decision by Saudi Arabia  and some of its 
neighbors  to increase  their  share  of the oil market.  Unlike  other  produc- 
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ers, they did not suffer  great  revenue  losses, because the price declines 
were offset by their  output  increases. But with oil prices as low as $12  a 
barrel,  their  revenue  would  also decline, so that  they can be expected to 
restrict  output  at that price, even unilaterally.  I expect, therefore, that 
OPEC's August 1986 agreement  in Geneva to restrict output will be 
successful. By no means  does the 1986  price  collapse  represent  the death 
of OPEC,  as has often been proclaimed. 
Over the next two  decades, price can be  expected to  increase 
substantially,  although  OPEC  will continue  to have difficulty  restricting 
output if it raises price too far above what is warranted  by market 
conditions. The world's oil resources are still heavily concentrated  in 
the Persian  Gulf, and there is no alternative  energy source now on the 
horizon that is  cheap, clean, and plentiful. With continuing world 
economic growth  eventually outweighing  the demand-reducing  adjust- 
ment to the 1973-74 and 1979-80 price increases, and with limited 
prospects for continuing  expansion of non-OPEC  production,  the de- 
mand  for OPEC  oil will grow substantially,  and OPEC  will respond  by 
raising  the price. But OPEC, especially Saudi  Arabia  and its allies, will 
probably  be cautious  in the future  about abrupt  price increases, having 
seen the consequences during  1980-86. 
In  the event of a major  disruption,  however,  price  could  go up sharply, 
and  the West will be only slightly  less vulnerable  than  it was in 1979-80. 
Although  the resulting  price increase need not be permanent,  it would 
again  have a substantial  negative  effect on the world  economy. 
Overview of the Data 
In 1973-74  the  real  price  of crude  oil more  than  tripled.  ' After  declining 
slightly  in 1975-78, it doubled  again  in 1979-80. But the 1979-80 price 
increase  was eroded  between 1981  and 1985,  as price  declined  by nearly 
40 percent. Price  then collapsed  in the first  half of 1986,  falling  by more 
than  50 percent. Within  the past five years, the real  price  of oil has fallen 
from  more  than  a fivefold  multiple  of its 1970  value to less than  a twofold 
multiple. 
As illustrated  in figure  1, the world  demand  for oil, which had grown 
1.  See  U.S.  Department  of  Energy,  Energy  Information  Administration,  Annual 
Review of Energy 1985, DOE/EIA-0384(85) (DOE,  1985), p. 135. Dermot Gately  239 
rapidly  before  the 1973-74  price  increase,  grew  much  less rapidly  during 
1973-78. It then fell by about 10  percent  during  1979-83 and has grown 
only slightly since. The OECD had both the biggest demand growth 
before 1973 and the biggest declines after the two price increases. 
Demand  in the Soviet Union and in the rest of the world  also increased 
rapidly  before 1973  and has continued  to increase since, although  at a 
slower  pace. 
Figure  2 shows regional  changes in world oil production  since 1970. 
Until 1976  the non-OPEC  oil supply  grew quite slowly. Since 1977  there 
have  been substantial  increases  from  Mexico, the North  Sea, and  a large 
number  of small producers.2  The 16 percent decrease in U.S. output 
Figure 1.  World Oil Demand, by Region, 1970-85 
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2. Between 1979  and 1985  five non-OPEC  developing  countries  (Brazil,  Egypt,  India, 
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during  1970-76  was halted  by an increase  in Alaskan  production  starting 
in 1977.  But total U.S. output  in 1985  was still around  7 percent below 
its 1970  peak, despite much  higher  prices; without  Alaska, U.S. output 
would have been 25 percent  lower in 1985  than  in 1970. 
OPEC, as the price-setting  residual supplier, has had to reduce its 
output  to support  a given price level. It has seen the demand  for its oil 
fall by nearly  40 percent  between 1979  and 1982  and remain  low since. 
The changes in output  within OPEC  from 1970  to 1986  are depicted in 
figure  3.3 Virtually  all OPEC members  shared in the burden  of output 
Figure 2.  World Oil Production, by Region, 1970-86 
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restriction  from 1979  to 1985:  each cut output at least 20 percent. But 
the  greatest  percentage  cutbacks  were borne  by Saudi  Arabia  (more  than 
60 percent of its 1979 level), Kuwait (almost 60 percent), and Libya 
(almost 50 percent). Iraq and Iran are special cases, given their war- 
related output reductions. But since their minimum  output levels in 
1981-82, both have been increasing  their output slightly  and thus their 
Figure 3.  OPEC Output Levels,  1970-86 
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(UAE), and Qatar  are immediate  neighbors  of Saudi  Arabia  and have usually  followed 
similar  policies. Libya and Algeria  are North African  producers  who have often pushed 
for higher  prices and have restricted  output when necessary. The "Others" include 
Indonesia,  Nigeria,  Venezuela,  and  two small  producers,  Ecuador  and  Gabon;  this group 
has  been  least  willing  to restrict  output.  The 1986  figures  are  averages  through  May. 242  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1986 
share of OPEC output significantly.  From August 1985  through  mid- 
1986,  OPEC  output  increased  by about 4 million  barrels  per day (bpd), 
or  about  25  percent.  More  than  half  the increase  came  from  Saudi  Arabia, 
but some other members also had significant increases, especially 
Kuwait,  the United  Arab  Emirates  (UAE), Iraq,  and  Nigeria.  In the face 
of the price collapse, Iran and Mexico (a non-OPEC  producer) cut 
output. 
The sharp  declines in OPEC  output  since 1980,  together  with signifi- 
cant real price declines, have resulted in a dramatic  drop in OPEC 
revenue, as depicted in figure  4. During 1983-85 OPEC revenue was 
below its level in the mid-1970s  and less than half what it had been in 
1980-81. After prices collapsed in 1986, OPEC  revenue fell further,  to 
only slightly  above its pre-1973  levels. In the short run, therefore, the 
demand  for OPEC  oil is still inelastic. Within  OPEC, Saudi  Arabia  and 
Kuwait experienced the sharpest  revenue declines during  1981-85, as 
they had  the largest  output  cutbacks. 
Figure  5 illustrates  trends  in price, output,  and  revenue  for both Saudi 
Arabia  and  OPEC  as a whole, from 1970  to 1986.  Among  other  things, it 
shows clearly  the differing  revenue  impact  of the 1985-86  price  declines. 
For Saudi Arabia, revenue has declined only slightly: the 50 percent 
price  declines  were almost  offset by increased  output.  But, for OPEC  as 
a whole, revenue  has declined  sharply. 
Although  OPEC's share of world oil production  has declined since 
1973 to less than 30 percent, its share of the world's oil reserves  has 
remained  roughly  constant, at about  two-thirds  of the total.4  Despite an 
enormous  amount  of exploration,  the only substantial  non-OPEC  dis- 
coveries since 1973  have been in Mexico, whose share  of world  reserves 
is now about 10  percent.  (North  Sea and  Alaskan  oil had  been discovered 
in the late 1960s  and is only a small  part of the world's total reserves.) 
Oil production  since 1970  has exceeded discoveries, mostly because of 
the sharp  decline  in discoveries  within  the Middle  East.5  The oil reserves 
4.  For  both  proved  reserves  and  estimated  undiscovered  reserves, see Department  of 
Energy,  Energy  Information Administration,  International  Energy  Outlook 1985,  with 
Projections to 1995, DOE/EIA-0484 (85) (DOE,  1985), table 3, p. 12. 
5. See Exxon  Corporation,  WorldEnergy  Outlook(Exxon  Background  Series,  Decem- 
ber 1980), p. 24. The decline could be a consequence of those countries  having little 
incentive  to explore  further,  given  their  already  huge  reserves. But  more  likely  the largest 
fields  are  discovered  relatively  early  in the history  of a given  oil province.  See Gordon  M. 
Kaufman,  Statistical  Decision  and  Related  Techniques  in  Oil  and  Gas  Exploration 
(Prentice  Hall, 1962);  "Oil and Gas: Estimation  of Undiscovered  Resources," in M. A. Dermot Gately  243 
Figure 4.  OPEC Revenue Levels, 1970-86a 
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a.  Product of the real U.S.  price of imported crude oil and OPEC production levels. 
of the United States, Canada,  and the North Sea would be exhausted 
after  about  three  decades  of production  at 1985  levels. Most  Persian  Gulf 
producers,  on the other  hand, could sustain 1985  output  levels for more 
than  a century. 
Adelman  and  others,  Energy Resources  in an Uncertain Future (Ballinger,  1983);  and  R. 
Nehring, "Prospects for Conventional  World  Oil Resources," in Jack M. Hollander, 
Harvey  Brooks,  and Melvin  K. Simmons,  eds., Annual Review of Energy, vol. 7 (1982), 
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Review of Expert Opinion, 1973-85 
When oil prices collapsed in 1986, it was not the first time that the 
world  oil market  had  surprised  most observers.  It is instructive  to review 
how well the experts  have kept pace with the market  since 1973.6 
ANALYSES  DURING  1973-78 
In 1973-74 many experts believed that OPEC had blundered by 
raising  its price to an unsustainably  high level and that it was pricing 
itself out of the market.  Milton  Friedman  presented  an extreme version 
of this view in March  1974:  "In order  to keep prices  up, the Arabs  would 
have to curtail  their  output  by ever larger  amounts.  But even if they cut 
their  output  to zero, they could  not  for long  keep the world  price  of crude 
at $10.00  a barrel."7 
Figure 5.  Price, Output, and Revenue Comparison, Saudi Arabia and OPEC,  1970-86 
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6. Other surveys of this literature  can be found in Dermot Gately, "A Ten-Year 
Retrospective:  OPEC  and the World  Oil Market,"  Journal  of Economic  Literature,  vol. 
22 (September  1984),  pp. 1100-14;  and  James  M. Griffin  and  David  J. Teece, eds., OPEC 
Behavior and World Oil Prices (London: George Allen and Unwin,  1982). 
7.  Newsweek  (March 4, 1974), p. 71. Dermot Gately  245 
Yet, as the analytic  work  of 1974-75 appeared,  much  of it concluded 
that  the pre-1973  price  had  been unsustainably  low. But, overestimating 
both the adjustment  speed of demand and the increase in non-OPEC 
supply  in response  to higher  prices, it also concluded  that  the 1975  price 
was too high for OPEC's long-run  interest and that some downward 
adjustment  would  be necessary.8 
In 1976-78, the demand  for OPEC oil recovered from its 1974-75 
decline. There had been little non-OPEC supply response to higher 
prices, and world oil demand had resumed its growth, although at a 
diminished  rate. Most observers had come to view the 1973-74 price 
increase as  sustainable, but as a one-time event,  corresponding  to 
OPEC's successful cartelization  of the world oil market. Henceforth, 
price was expected to rise only gradually,  up to the "backstop"  cost of 
alternative  energy  sources.9  But some analysts, most notably  the Work- 
shop on Alternative  Energy  Strategies  (WAES), argued  in 1977-78  that 
price was unsustainably  low. They concluded  that if the real price were 
held  constant  through  the 1980s,  projected  oil demand  would  exceed the 
likely supply.1I 
8. The seven models  available  in 1974-75  were reviewed  in Dietrich  Fischer,  Dermot 
Gately,  and  John  F. Kyle, "The Prospects  for OPEC:  a Critical  Survey  of Models  of the 
World Oil Market,"  Journal  of Development  Economics,  vol.  2 (December  1975), pp. 
363-86. The models  were those of Charles  Blitzer,  Alex Meeraus,  and  Ardy  Stoutjesdijk, 
"A Dynamic  Model  of OPEC  Trade  and  Production,"  Journal  ofDevelopmentEconomics, 
vol. 2 (December  1975),  pp. 319-35; Douglas  R. Bohi and Milton  Russell, U.S. Energy 
Policy (Resources  for the Future,  Johns Hopkins  University  Press, 1975);  U.S. Federal 
Energy  Administration,  Project  Independence  Report  (Government  Printing  Office,  1974); 
Michael Kennedy, "An Economic Model of the World  Oil Market,"  Bell Journal of 
Economics  and  Management  Science,  vol.  5  (Autumn  1974),  pp.  540-77;  Basil  A. 
Kalyman,  "Economic  Incentives  in OPEC  Oil Pricing  Policy," Journal  of Development 
Economics,  vol. 2 (December  1975),  pp. 337-62; W. J. Levy, "Implications  of World  Oil 
Austerity"  (30 Rockefeller  Plaza, New York, N.Y.); and William  D. Nordhaus, "The 
Allocation  of Energy  Resources,"  BPEA,  3:1973,  pp. 529-70. 
9. Price was expected to stay below the backstop cost, the cost of alternatives  to 
conventional  oil, such as shale oil, tar sands, or coal liquifaction.  Unfortunately,  it was 
rarely  noted  that  the backstop  cost could  be an upper  limit  only in the long  run,  when  there 
would  be sufficient  time to expand  capacity.  This could  be three  decades,  or more.  In the 
meantime,  OPEC's  price  could  well rise  above  the backstop  cost. Furthermore,  estimates 
of the cost of these alternatives  increased  dramatically  in the late 1970s  as more was 
learned  about  their  technical  characteristics.  In World  Oil a cost of $60 a barrel  (in 1981 
dollars)  was used for the backstop,  which was also assumed  to be capacity-constrained 
through  2010.  Not surprisingly,  the price  projections  rose above  the backstop  cost, before 
coming  down again when backstop capacity expanded. See Energy Modeling  Forum, 
World  Oil,  EMF  Report  6, Summary  Report  (Stanford,  Calif.:  EMF, February  1982). 
10. Workshop  on Alternative  energy Strategies,  Energy: Global Prospects, 1985- 246  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1986 
In a 1978 survey, I drew the following conclusions: 
Having  reviewed  nearly  two dozen  models  and  analyses  of OPEC  and  energy 
markets,  what can be said about  the 1980's?  Briefly,  the status  quo through  the 
early-to-mid  1980's,  with a tightening  world  oil market  possible  thereafter. 
In the coming  five years [1979-1984]  virtually  all analyses project  a contin- 
uation  of current  market  conditions  in the world  oil market.  .  .  . But we do not 
expect substantial  changes  in real  prices, either  down  or up, given  the stabilizing 
position  of Saudi  Arabia  and  its Arab  allies on the Persian  Gulf. 
The outlook beyond 1985,  however, remains  very uncertain.  Many  forecast 
a continuation  of current  market  conditions  for the entire  decade. Many  others 
project  inicreased  tightening  of the world  oil market.  "I 
ANALYSES  DURING  1979-81  AND  THE  EMF  WORLD  OIL  STUDY 
The abrupt 1979-80  price doubling clearly came as a surprise. Few 
observers had anticipated another price increase, especially one so large. 
In less  than  a  decade,  OPEC  had  increased  the  real price  fivefold. 
These were heady times for OPEC, as Fereidun Fesharaki wrote in 1981, 
"As to the extent of the price increases  [ in the 1980s], one can only say 
with certainty that real prices will not be allowed to decline again. ... 
On the price front, price unity seems to have permanently disappeared. 
OPEC feels no need for it anymore.  .  .  Real prices are expected  to rise 
by  three  to  ten  percent  per  annum  during  the  1980's,  at  irregular 
intervals." 12 
It now  seems  clear that OPEC overshot  the mark with its  1979-80 
price doubling. Groping for an "optimal"  price, OPEC misinterpreted 
the  spot  market price  as a good  indicator of a long-term equilibrium 
price. It raised its contract price too much and too rapidly. 13  In particular, 
the Saudis must regret their decision  of January 20, 1979, to cut output 
during the height of the Iranian revolution. 14 
2000 (McGraw-Hill,  1977).  WAES assumed  high economic  growth  rates. The high-  and 
low-growth  assumptions  were, respectively,  6 percent  and  3.5 percent. 
11. Dermot  Gately, "The Prospects  for OPEC  Five Years  after 1973-74," European 
Economic  Review,  vol. 12  (October  1979),  p. 378. 
12. Fereidun  Fesharaki,  "World  Oil  Availability:  The  Role  of OPEC  Policies," in  Jack 
M. Hollander,  Melvin  K. Simmons,  and  David  0. Wood,  eds., Annual  Review  of Energy, 
vol. 6 (1981),  pp. 304, 306, 307. 
13. For a description  of OPEC  determining  its contract  price as a function  of recent 
spot market prices,  see  Philip K.  Verleger,  Jr.,  Oil Markets in Turmoil: An Economic 
Analysis  (Ballinger,  1982). 
14. M. A. Adelman,  "OPEC  as a Cartel,"  in Griffin  and  Teece, OPEC  Behavior  and 
World Oil Prices,  pp. 37-63. Dermot Gately  247 
During 1980-81, the Energy Modeling Forum (EMF) of Stanford 
University  conducted  a controlled  comparison  of ten prominent  models 
of the international  oil market.  1  Most of the models were simulation 
models, in which OPEC set price according  to some target-capacity- 
utilization  pricing  rule. In only one of the models did OPEC act as an 
intertemporal  wealth-maximizing  price-setter.16 In one model OPEC 
capacity was endogenous; the rest assumed that OPEC capacity was 
constant at 34 million bpd. In all models OPEC acted as the residual 
supplier,  producing  the difference  between world oil demand  and non- 
OPEC  supply. 
The EMF study  remains  one of the most useful  pieces of work in this 
area. It made standardized  assumptions for a variety of parameter 
values, such as economic growth  rates, the size of the resource  base for 
conventional  oil, the cost of alternative  energy  sources, OPEC  capacity, 
and  the responsiveness  of oil demand  to changes  in  price  and  in economic 
growth.  For each of twelve "scenarios" (each defined  by a given set of 
assumptions  about the world oil market), the models generated their 
respective  projections. 
The study's long-run  conclusions about world oil prices were fairly 
pessimistic:  in none of the models  under  any of the scenarios  were world 
oil prices lower in the year 2000  than  they were in 1980;  in most, prices 
were considerably  higher.  As the final  report  concluded, "While there 
remains  a high degree of uncertainty  about  future  world oil prices, our 
analysis  suggests  that  most  of this uncertainty  concerns  not whether  real 
prices will rise during  the next several decades but rather  how rapidly 
they will rise. . . . We expect a soft oil market during the first half of the 
decade unless another  supply  disruption  occurs, but by 1990  real  prices 
15. Included  were two models from the Department  of Energy (WOIL  and IEES/ 
OMS),  three  from  universities  (Choucri's  IPE, Gately-Kyle-Fischer,  and  Manne's  ETA- 
MACRO),  and others from various institutions  (British  Petroleum,  Kennedy-Nehring, 
Salant-ICF,  Ervik's  OILTANK,  and  OILMAR).  Several  are  available  commercially.  See 
Energy  Modeling  Forum,  World  Oil, and  EMF, "World  Oil Graphics"  (EMF, 1982).  For 
separate  descriptions  of the Choucri,  Gately-Kyle-Fischer,  Manne,  and Salant  models, 
see Nazli Choucri,  International  Energy  Futures  (MIT  Press, 1981);  Dermot  Gately  and 
John F. Kyle, in association with Dietrich Fischer, "Strategies  for OPEC's Pricing 
Decisions," European  Economic  Review,  vol. 10 (November  1977),  pp. 209-30; Alan S. 
Manne,  "ETA-MACRO:  A Model  of Energy-Economy  Interactions,"  in Charles  J. Hitch, 
ed.,  Modeling Energy-Economy  Interactions:  Five Approaches  (Washington, D.C.:  Re- 
sources  for the Future,  1977),  pp. 1-45;  and  Stephen  W. Salant,  Imperfect  Competition  in 
the World Oil Market (D.C. Heath,  1982). 
16.  Salant, Imperfect Competition. 248  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1986 
can be expected to exceed their current  high levels." 17 But even with a 
large  number  of standardized  parameter  assumptions,  the range  of price 
projections  from different  models for a given scenario  is striking.  For a 
typical scenario, the range of prices projected  for the year 2000 was 
between $40  a barrel  and $80  a barrel  (in 1981  dollars). 
The accuracy of the EMF study's short-term  projections can be 
evaluated  by comparing  the projections  for 1980-85 with actual  prices, 
output,  and  demand.  The  appropriate  EMF  scenario  is the low economic 
growth scenario, which assumed annual growth rates of about 2.3 
percent.18  Of the ten models only Choucri's projected  declines in the 
demand  for OPEC oil comparable  to the actual 12 million bpd drop. 
While  a few models projected  declines in world  oil demand  comparable 
to the actual decline of 5-7  million bpd, only Choucri  also projected 
significant  non-OPEC oil production increases. Most of the models 
projected  constant or increasing  prices. Only three of the ten models 
projected  price  declines, and  all three  predictions  were less than  half  the 
actual decline through 1985.19 
Virtually  all the EMF models underestimated  the declining  demand 
for OPEC oil during 1980-85. All but one of the models were too 
pessimistic about the near-term  possibilities for increasing  non-OPEC 
production:  even with constant or higher prices, few models showed 
increases.20  Misjudgments  by individual modelers about non-OPEC 
supply increases were compounded by underestimates  in the EMF 
standardized  assumptions  about price-responsiveness  of world oil de- 
mand and about the amount  of lagged responsiveness to the 1973-74 
price increases still to come. 
But the failure  of the EMF models to project  declining  prices during 
17. EMF, World  Oil,  pp. 2-3. 
18. Even  the  2.3 percent  annual  growth  rate  is higher  than  the  actual  2.1 percent  growth 
rate for the OECD and 1.6 percent rate for non-OECD  countries; see Shell Briefing 
Service, The World  Oil Scene and OPEC  (London:  Shell International  Company,  Ltd., 
1986). 
19. Choucri,  Gately-Kyle-Fischer,  and  the Department  of Energy's  IEES/OMS. 
20. Some industry  analysts  projected  non-OPEC  supply  increases  by 1985,  but  not as 
great  as the 15 percent  increase  over 1980  that did occur, even in the face of real price 
declines. For example,  Exxon had  projected  that  non-OPEC  supply  would  be 15  percent 
higher  in 1990  than  in 1979  (Exxon, World  Energy  Outlook).  And  John  Lichtblau  in 1981 
projected  a 24 percent increase by 1990  and 13 percent by 1985  (compared  with 1980 
output);  see "The Limitation  to OPEC's Pricing  Policy," in Griffin  and Teece, OPEC 
Behavior and World Oil Prices,  pp. 131-44. Dermot Gately  249 
the early 1980s does not mean that their projections of substantially 
higher  prices by the year 2000  can be brushed  aside. Those projections 
resulted  mostly  from  increases  expected during  the 1990s.  By that  time, 
world oil demand was expected to grow more rapidly, as demand- 
increasing  economic growth  eventually  overtook the demand-reducing 
adjustment  to the two major  price increases. With  limited  prospects  for 
continuing  expansion  of non-OPEC  production,  the demand  for OPEC 
oil was expected to grow substantially  and OPEC was expected to 
respond  by raising  the price. Although  actual  price is lower in 1986  than 
anticipated  in 1980  or even 1985,  that  fundamental  dynamic  is even more 
relevant now, because the 1980-86 price declines have tempered  the 
demand-reducing  effects of the 1979-80  price increases. 
INTERNATIONAL  ENERGY  WORKSHOP  POLLS 
The best summary  of recent energy projections  can be found in the 
polls by the International  Energy Workshop  (IEW), as described by 
Alan  Manne  and  Leo Schrattenholzer.21  These  polls, conducted  annually 
since 1981 and covering energy prices and quantities over the next 
twenty-five years, survey some eighty organizations, analysts, and 
modeling  groups  located throughout  the world. 
Price projections  in the polls have changed significantly  since 1981. 
As  figure 6  shows,  between the  1981 and 1986 polls,  the median 
projections  of crude oil prices for the year 2000 fell as sharply  as did 
actual  prices in the years 1981-86.22 Such a sharp  downward  revision  of 
price projections seems unsupported  by the underlying  demand and 
supply situation over the longer term. It appears to be  a case  of 
overcompensating  for current  market  conditions. 
According  to the median  projection  in the 1985  poll, total world oil 
demand  is projected  to grow relatively  slowly through  the year 2000, at 
21. Alan S. Manne and Leo Schrattenholzer,  "International  Energy Workshop:  A 
Progress  Report" (International  Energy Workshop, Stanford, California,  July 1985); 
"International  Energy Workshop:  Summary  of Poll Responses" (IEW, July 1985); 
"International  Energy Workshop:  Oil Price Projections"  (IEW, 1986),  forthcoming  in 
Energy  Journal;  and "International  Energy Workshop:  Overview  of Poll Responses" 
(IEW,  July 1986). 
22. Although  the group  of respondents  varies  somewhat  from  one year  to another,  the 
poll's authors  argue  that the variation  cannot  explain  the dramatic  revision  of projected 
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an annual  rate of 0.7 percent. Within  the developing  countries,  demand 
is projected  to continue  to grow  at a moderate  rate. But it is expected to 
,grow very slowly in the centrally planned economies and to decline 
slightly  in the OECD. The region with the widest range  of oil demand 
projections  is non-OPEC  developing  countries. Output  in the centrally 
planned  economies  and  in  the OECD  is expected  to be fairly  flat.  Declines 
in U.S. output  would be offset by increases  elsewhere in the OECD. In 
the non-OPEC developing countries output is  expected to double, 
although  there  is a wide range  of projections,  which  suggests  uncertainty 
about their resource base. The residual supplier will continue to be 
OPEC,  whose production  is expected to increase significantly  by 2000, 
to slightly  above its 1980  value of some 30 million  bpd, or 50 percent 
higher  than  its 1985  output  level. There  is also a wide  range  of projections 
for OPEC output, but the uncertainty  is about their price and output 
decisions, rather  than  about  their  resource  base. 
Figure 6.  Oil Prices,  1970-86,  and Successive Price Projections, 1990-2010 
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Sources:  Alan  S.  Manne  and  Leo  Schrattenholzer,  'International  Energy  Workshop:  A  Progress  Report" 
(International Energy  Workshop,  Stanford,  Calif.,  July  1985);  "International Energy  Workshop:  Summary of  Poll 
Responses"  (IEW,  July  1985); "International Energy Workshop: Oil Price Projections,"  (IEW,  1986), forthcoming 
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HOGAN  AND  LEIBY  PROJECTIONS 
Any projection  involving  many  assumptions  about  parameter  values 
and model structure  will necessarily  result  not in a single value but in a 
range of possible values. This unavoidable  uncertainty  is nicely illus- 
trated  in figure  7, drawn  from  the work  of William  Hogan  and  Paul  Leiby, 
which shows oil price projections  for 1987, 1990, 1995,  and 2000, made 
under  a variety of assumptions  about whether a disruption  occurs in a 
given year and  about certain  parameter  values such as demand  elastici- 
ties, the capacity of OPEC and its target level of capacity utilization, 
and  exchange  rates.23 
The price distributions  depict the range of uncertainty  for oil prices 
as a function of the assumptions  made.24  The lower ends of the price 
distributions  for 1987  and 1990  are not much  below the 1985  price level; 
the upper tails stretch quite high. The asymmetry results from the 
omission of such assumptions  as a complete OPEC  collapse or a large 
and sudden output increase, such as occurred in 1985-86. Also, the 
assumed OPEC pricing  function responds asymmetrically,  depending 
upon whether OPEC output is above or below the target levels of 
capacity utilization:  price would be increased more rapidly if output 
were above the target than it would be cut if output were below the 
target. 
Understanding  the 1986 Price Collapse 
Early in 1986,  after  years of futile attempts  to get its OPEC  partners 
to observe their production quotas and share the burden of output 
restriction more equitably, Saudi Arabia and its allies undertook to 
produce  their "fair  share"  and  let price  fall as a consequence.25  The dire 
23. William  W. Hogan  and  Paul  N. Leiby, "Oil  Market  Risk  Analysis,"  Report  of the 
Harvard  Energy Security Project (Harvard  University, John F. Kennedy School of 
Government,  December  1985). 
24. The distribution  is sawtoothed,  rather  than smooth, because a relatively small 
number  of parameter  cases were  considered.  As the  number  and  variety  of cases increased, 
the distribution  would  become smoother. 
25. There is  no conclusive evidence to  support the view that inventories were 
destabilizing  during  the price collapse. (In 1979-80, during  the Iranian  revolution, oil 252  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1986 
future  about which the Saudis  had warned  their  partners  became a dire 
reality.  Although  the  revenue  of the Saudis  has  been  relatively  unaffected 
by the price decreases, the revenue of other OPEC  members  has been 
greatly  reduced. 
As long as the price cuts are not carried  too far, they offer longer- 
term  benefits  for Saudi  revenue  and  for  the credibility  of any  future  Saudi 
threats  to increase  output.  Because of the Saudis'  huge  oil reserves, they 
Figure 7.  Risk Analysis Projections of World Oil Pricesa 
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Sources:  William  W. Hogan  and Paul N. Leiby, "Oil Market  Risk Analysis," Report  of the Harvard  Energy 
Security  Project  (Harvard  University,  John  F. Kennedy  School  of Government,  December  1985). 
a. Alternative  oil price  forecasts  under  varying  assumptions  of demand  elasticities,  OPEC  capacity,  its target  level 
of capacity,  and exchange  rates  for non-U.S.  demand  regions. 
inventories  were built up at tne rate of 1-2 million bpd. This aggravated  the market 
tightness  and drove spot prices and contract  prices higher  than they would have gone 
otherwise.)  Total OECD  inventory  from  August 1985  through  February  1986  was being 
built  up slightly,  by about  7 percent,  the reverse  of normal  seasonal  drawdown  patterns. 
Such behavior  would tend to slow the rate of price decrease, rather  than accelerate  it. 
However,  one factor  complicating  the analysis  was the adoption  of "netback"  pricing  by 
many  OPEC  countries  in the last quarter  of 1985.  Under  this scheme  the price  of crude  oil 
was determined  by the prices at which the products  were sold, plus some guaranteed 
markup  for the refiners.  The shift  to this type of pricing  scheme  would  have had  a positive 
effect  upon  inventories  of both  crude  oil and  refined  products.  Thus  the inventory  buildup 
by itself provides inconclusive evidence on the question of  destabilizing  inventory 
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and their Arab  neighbors  on the Persian  Gulf have a greater  long-term 
stake in the world oil market  than do most other OPEC  members  and 
most non-OPEC  producers, who will have relatively little oil left in 
twenty years. The Saudis do not want the long-term  health of their 
market  jeopardized  by irreversible  fuel-switching  or the development  of 
alternative  energy  sources. 
Some simulation  runs  from  my OPEC  Pricing  Simulation  Model will 
shed light upon the 1986 oil price collapse and highlight  the choices 
facing  OPEC  for the future.26  The projections  that  follow are illustrative 
and are not to be interpreted  as forecasts. Although  I believe that the 
underlying  parameter  values assumed  are quite reasonable,  I am aware 
of the unavoidable  uncertainty  involved.27 
The model is an annual  model of the world  market  for crude  oil. In it, 
price,  measured  in 1985  dollars,  is determined  by OPEC,  which  produces 
the difference  between world  oil demand  and non-OPEC  supply.28  The 
model is disaggregated  regionally into non-OPEC and a country-by- 
country  disaggregation  of OPEC. 
The thirteen  members  of OPEC are divided into three groups. The 
"Core" of OPEC  consists of Saudi  Arabia  and  its immediate  neighbors, 
Kuwait,  the United  Arab  Emirates,  and  Qatar.  Iran  and  Iraq  are  grouped 
together  because their  output  has been reduced  by war  and  will increase 
when the conflict is resolved; their output levels are assumed to be 
exogenous  to the  model.29The  rest  of OPEC  consists  of Algeria,  Ecuador, 
Gabon,  Indonesia,  Libya, Nigeria,  and  Venezuela.  They are  assumed  to 
produce at the same level in 1986  as they did in 1985.30  For 1987  and 
26. The model  is described  in Dermot  Gately, "OPEC:  Retrospective  and  Prospects, 
1973-1990,"  European Economic Review, vol. 21 (May 1983),  pp. 313-3  1; and  in Gately, 
Kyle, and Fischer, "Strategies  for OPEC's Pricing  Decisions." It was a participating 
model  in the EMF  world  oil stujdy  and  is commercially  available  on the IBM  PC. 
27. See the discussion  above of the work  by Hogan  and  Leiby. See also Gately,  Kyle, 
and  Fischer,  "Strategies  for OPEC's  Pricing  Decisions." 
28. World  oil demand  is calculated  as a constant-elasticity  function  of current  and  past 
prices  (with  a uniform  lag for the effects of past prices). I assume  that  world  GNP grows 
at  2.5 percent  annually,  regardless  of the  level  of oil prices.  Non-OPEC  supply  is calculated 
from  a competitive  (linear)  supply  function. 
29. Their  output  is assumed  to be 4 million  bpd  in 1985  and 1986,  rising  gradually  to 6 
million  bpd by 1988,  and kept constant  at that  level thereafter.  The remainder  of OPEC 
is assumed to "make room" for the extra 2 million  bpd output from Iran and Iraq in 
1986-88. 
30. Although  there  is some variation  within  this group,  on balance  this is a reasonable 
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beyond, they share equally with the Core any increases in the demand 
for OPEC oil (above that produced  by Iran and Iraq);  they also share 
decreases with the Core, but not equally:  the Core bears 70 percent of 
further  cutbacks  needed. 
Six cases are simulated:  three  different  initial  prices-$26,  $18, $10- 
for each of two OPEC output ceilings-25  million bpd and 35 million 
bpd. Price starts  at one of three  initial  prices in 1986  and  remains  at that 
level until  the demand  for OPEC  oil reaches  the assumed  output  ceiling, 
after which time the market-clearing  price is calculated.  The $26 initial 
price is intended  as a reference  case and can be thought  of as the 1985 
status  quo. With  the other  two, the 1986  price drops  to either  $18  or $10 
because of output  increases by OPEC's Core. The path to a 25 million 
bpd output  ceiling  can be thought  of as a stylized "return  to normality" 
for OPEC.3'  The 35 million  bpd level is an alternative  ceiling, suggested 
by some who believe it to be preferable  for the Core, from whom the 
additional  10  million  bpd  output  is assumed  to come. 
Four  of these six cases are graphed  in figure  8, which shows the price 
path of oil starting  from  each of the three initial  prices with a 25 million 
bpd ceiling  and starting  from  $10 with a 35 million  bpd ceiling. (The two 
cases that are not graphed  could be interpolated.)  The corresponding 
levels of Core  output  and  resulting  demands  for OPEC  oil and  for world 
oil are shown in figure  9. The implications  of these price paths for the 
Core's revenue  are depicted  in figure  10. The net present  value of 1986- 
2000 revenue and of oil reserves remaining  in the year 2000, for all six 
cases, are summarized  in figures 11 and 12, using discount rates of 10 
percent  and 20 percent, respectively. 
As figures 8 and 9 show, the lower price drops in 1986, the more 
rapidly  demand  for OPEC  oil increases, both because world  oil demand 
increases more rapidly  and because non-OPEC  supply is deterred. If 
price stays at $26, OPEC  does not reach  25 million  bpd  until 1997.  But if 
price drops to $18, OPEC  reaches 25 million  bpd in 1994.  With  price at 
$10, OPEC  reaches 25 million  bpd in 1990  and 35 million  bpd in 1995. 
The $26 constant-price case  requires OPEC's Core to  continue 
restricting  its output  well into  the mid-1990s.  Only  then  does the demand 
for OPEC  oil get back  above 20 million  bpd. But if the Core  increases  its 
31. At the 25 million bpd level, OPEC's Core produces at 66 percent of its 1985 
capacity,  the rest  of OPEC  at 85 percent  of its 1985  capacity,  and  Iran  and  Iraq  at 6 million 
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1986 output to about 8 million bpd, so that price falls to $18, it can 
maintain  that  8 million  bpd  output  level until  the early 1990s.  Thereafter, 
it can  gradually  increase  its output  as the demand  for  OPEC  oil increases, 
up to the 25 million  bpd target.  Going  still further,  if the Core increases 
its output to about 11 million bpd, which is still only two-thirds  of its 
1985 capacity level, the 1986 price falls to $10. In that case it could 
maintain  that  output  level and  the $10  price  until 1990,  while the growth 
in demand  for OPEC  oil to 25 million  bpd is met by Iran,  Iraq, and the 
rest of OPEC.  With  a 35 million  bpd  ceiling, the $10  price  continues  until 
1995,  as the Core increases its output  by 10 million  bpd between 1989 
and 1995. 
Figure 8.  Alternative Price Paths, 1985-2000a 
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and Dermot Gately,  "OPEC: Retrospective  and Prospects,  1973-1990,"  European Economic  Review,  vol.  21 (May 
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European Economic  Review,  vol.  10 (February  1977), pp. 209-30. 
a.  In the four simulations  price is determined  by  OPEC at one  of the three initial prices  in  1986 and remains at 
that level until the demand for OPEC oil reaches  the assumed  output ceiling (25 million bpd or 35 million bpd), after 
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The revenue implications  of these cases help us understand  what 
happened  in 1986.  As figure 10 shows, the Core's 1986  revenue is not 
much affected whether  price is $26 or $18. But if price falls to $10 the 
Core's 1986  revenue  falls significantly,  by almost  20  percent.  In the short 
run, therefore, the Core faces a demand  curve for its oil with a price 
elasticity about equal to unity, at least down to a price of $18: output 
increases  are offset almost exactly by price declines, so that revenue is 
constant.  But  for a further  price  decline  to $  10,  it faces an inelastic  short- 
run demand  curve: price falls and revenue decreases. Over the entire 
range  from $26 down to $10, however, the short-run  demand  curve is 
inelastic  for the rest of OPEC  and for OPEC  as a whole: the lower the 
price, the lower is their 1986  revenue. 
As figure 10 shows, the constant $26 price yields the Core lower 
Figure 9.  World and OPEC Oil Demand and Output by OPEC Core, 1985-2000a 
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Source:  Same as figure 8. 
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revenue from 1987  through  the early 1990s  than the $18 price, because 
the high price requires  continued  restriction  of output. The $18 initial 
price yields the best revenue results, since the Core's revenue stays 
virtually  constant. The $10  initial  price has the lowest revenue  of all for 
the first  two years;  it remains  constant  for the late 1980s,  increasing  only 
when  OPEC  reaches  25 million  bpd  (or  35 million  bpd)  and  the price  rises 
substantially,  to market-clearing  levels. 
Beyond  the early 1990s  the revenue  results  are  dominated  by the price 
effects of demand  for OPEC oil reaching  25 million  bpd, after which a 
market-clearing  price is calculated. In these simulations,  the lower the 
price, the sooner  demand  for OPEC  oil gets back to 25 million  bpd, and 
the sooner  price  and  revenue  increase. 
The net present values (NPV) for pre-2000  OPEC  revenue and post- 
Figure 10.  Annual Revenue for OPEC Core, 1985-2000a 
Billions  of 1985  dollars 
(logarithmic scale) 
1000  0-  _ 
1000S>*0"'"""  __-  I  I  I 
1990  1995  2000 
$10 path to 25 million  bpd  *  $26 path to 25 million  bpd 
$18 path to 25 million  bpd  $10 path to 35 million  bpd 
Source:  Same  as figure  8. 
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2000 reserve valuation  are shown in figure 11  for each of the six cases, 
using a discount rate of 10 percent.32  With a 25 million  bpd ceiling, the 
OPEC totals are about the same for the three initial prices. But a 35 
million  bpd ceiling yields smaller  totals, especially in the lower-priced 
cases, because it means less pre-2000  revenue for non-Core  members. 
For the Core alone, the six cases yield about the same total NPV: the 
smaller  pre-2000  revenue for the $26 path is offset by the value of the 
larger  post-2000  reserves. 
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a. Net present  value from 1986-2000  revenue  and post-2000  oil reserves. In the model  it is assumed  that post- 
2000  oil reserves  would  be sold at a price of $60 a barrel  and that 5 percent  of reserves  would  be produced  each 
year. Thus a billion  barrels  of post-2000  oil would  be worth  $4.35 billion  today. If one assumes  a lower post-2000 
price,  then  the valuation  of post-2000  reserves  would  be proportionally  reduced. 
32. I assume that post-2000  oil reserves would be sold at a price of $60 and that 5 
percent  of reserves  would be produced  each year. Thus, a billion  barrels  of post-2000  oil 
would be worth $4.35 billion today. If one assumes a lower post-2000  price, then the 
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If a 20 percent  discount  rate  is used instead, the results  (figure  12)  are 
slightly different.33  The totals are smaller, of course, with a higher 
discount  rate, and the value of post-2000  oil reserves is a much smaller 
fraction  of the totals. Another  difference  is that  the rest of OPEC  would 
be substantially  better  off the higher  the price and the lower the output 
ceiling.  But  for  the Core,  much  is the same  as when  a 10  percent  discount 
rate  is used. The NPV "flatness"  across cases remains  the same, as does 
the preference  for $10  or $18 if only 1986-2000  revenue  is considered. 
To sum up, the results of these simulations  help clarify what has 
Figure 12.  Net Present Value, OPEC, Discount Rate 20 Percenta 
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a.  See figure 11, note a. 
33. See M. A. Adelman,  "Oil Producing  Countries'  Discount Rates" (MIT  Energy 
Lab Working  Paper, July 1986).  Adelman  argues that a subjective  discount rate of 20 
percent, or more, is appropriate  because many OPEC governments  have short time 
horizons,  face  the  risk  of political  instability,  and  behave  like  highly  leveraged,  undiversified 
corporations  with  precommitments  to spend  much  if not all of their  income. 260  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1986 
happened  in 1986 and what might be expected in the future. For the 
Core, the 1986  price declines have been offset by output increases so 
that 1986  revenue  has not been substantially  affected. But there  is a limit 
to the Core's ability to offset price declines by increasing  output. The 
July 1986 price of $12 is too low even for the Core's best short-run 
interest:  its 1986  revenue  would  increase  if  it  restricted  output  unilaterally 
and let price increase to the $16-$20 level.  The fact that OPEC's 
agreement  in early August 1986  at Geneva requires  virtually  all OPEC 
members  to cut back makes such output  restriction  even better  for the 
Core. 
Over  the longer  run, the Core  would  prefer  an initial  price lower than 
the 1985  status quo of $26, which would require  them to restrict  output 
for ten more years, with revenue declines for the next few years. But 
they would have no  strong preference for any of the other cases 
simulated.  The rest of OPEC, however, would clearly  prefer  the lower 
output ceiling and a higher  initial  price, especially if they use a higher 
discount  rate. 
What Should We Have Expected for 1985-86? 
Now that it has happened,  it is possible to understand  the 1986  price 
collapse. But it certainly came as a surprise  to most observers at the 
time.34  Analysts in 1985  were expecting continuing  weakness in price 
but not a collapse. It seemed unlikely  in 1985  that Saudi Arabia  would 
break  with the rest of OPEC  and take the high-profile,  politically  risky 
strategy  of forcing a price collapse.35  The risks were not only political 
34. A few analysts  may  not have  been  so surprised.  See George  Daly,  James  M. Griffin, 
and Henry B. Steele, "The Future  of OPEC:  Price Level and Cartel  Stability,"  Energy 
Journal,  vol. 4 (January  1983),  pp. 65-77; Eliyahu  Kanovsky,  "An Economic  Analysis  of 
Middle  East  Oil"  in Middle  East Contemporary  Survey  (Holmes  and  Meier,  1981);  S. Fred 
Singer,  "The Price  of World  Oil," Annual  Review  of Energy,  vol. 8 (1983),  pp. 451-508; 
Arlon  R. Tussing,  "Oil  Prices  Are Still  Too High,"  Energy  Journal,  vol. 6 (January  1985), 
pp. 9-12. 
35. For  a detailed  description  of Saudi  cautiousness,  see Theodore  Moran,  "Modeling 
OPEC Behavior:  Economic and Political Alternatives," in Griffin  and Teece, OPEC 
Behavior and World Oil Prices,  pp. 94-130. Dermot Gately  261 
and economic. There were also external military  risks: a hostile Iran 
might strike from across the Persian  Gulf, widening  its war with Iraq. 
Or,  joining with Libya, Iran might  foment destabilizing  activity within 
Saudi  Arabia. 
But if the price collapse seemed unlikely  from the vantage point of 
1985,  from  the perspective  of 1980  it can  only  be described  as astounding. 
While  many  observers  in 1980  expected some softness in oil prices after 
the 1979-80 price increases, few expected declining  prices to erode the 
entire  doubling  by 1985,  and  fewer still expected the 1986  price  collapse. 
The biggest surprise  was the continuing  increase  in non-OPEC  produc- 
tion (15 percent greater in 1985  than in 1980), especially from a large 
number  of relatively  small  producers.  The exploration  and  development 
underlying  these increases had been spurred  by the price increases of 
the 1970s  and  had  picked  up sufficient  momentum  and  incurred  sufficient 
fixed  costs not to be deterred  by the price declines of the early 1980s. 
For OPEC most of the damage occurred during 1980-82, when 
demand  for OPEC  oil fell from 30 million  bpd to below 20 million  bpd. 
Part  of the decline was the result of increasing  non-OPEC  supply. But 
most was the result  of a roughly  10  percent  decline in world  oil demand 
between 1979 and 1982 due to falling economic growth rates in the 
1980-82 recession, the lagged response to the 1973-74 and 1979-80 
price  increases, and  the decontrol  of U.S. oil prices, which  raised  prices 
significantly  during  1979-81.  36 
The 1980-82 decline in demand  for OPEC  oil came as something  of a 
surprise.  Should the 1983-85 sluggish market  have surprised  us? The 
continuing increase in non-OPEC supply, even in the face of price 
declines, was unexpected. But the sluggish  growth  in world  oil demand 
itself should  not have been very surprising.  In fact, oil demand  forecasts 
as of 1982 could have forecast the 1983-85 sluggishness in world oil 
demand  fairly accurately.  The weakness of the oil market,  despite the 
declining  dollar-denominated  price of oil, was the result of the lagged 
36. Although  the late-1970s  time series estiniates for individual  countries' demand 
responsiveness  to price were relatively  low, international  cross-section  studies yielded 
higher  response  estimates, which turned  out to be supported  by the demand  declines of 
1979-82.  See  Robert S. Pindyck,  The Structure of  World Energy Demand  (MIT Press, 
1979); and James M. Griffin, Energy Conservation in the OECD: 1980 to 2000 (Ballinger, 
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adjustment  to the 1979-80 price increases, combined with economic 
growth rates in 1983-85 only 60 percent of those in 1976-79 and less 
than  half  those in 1960-73.37 
To illustrate how accurately 1982 demand forecasts could have 
projected 1983-85 market  conditions, I used 1950-82 data to estimate, 
for each of the six largest  countries  in the OECD, a constant-elasticity 
(log-linear)  equation  for oil demand  as a function  of that  country's  GDP, 
own-currency  price of crude  oil, and  the effects of lagged  prices.38  In all 
cases but  Japan  and  the United States, I used a Koyck lag  for the effects 
of past prices; that is, I used the previous  year's oil demand  level as an 
explanatory  variable: 
(1)  log(Demand,)  =  c +  ot*log(Income,) +  P*Iog(Price,) 
+  k*log(Demand,-  ). 
For Japan and the United States, I assumed that the lagged-price 
coefficients  took the form of a cubic polynomial-distributed  lag, with a 
ten-year  lag length:39 
(2)  log(Demand,)  =  c +  co*log(Income,) +  E Pi log(Price,  ) 
where  the Pi  coefficients  were  of the  form  (with  no end-point  restrictions): 
(3)  i =  80 +  bli +  82i2  +  83i3. 
The estimated  coefficients  for these equations  with 1950-82 data  are 
presented  in table 1  for each of the six countries.40  With  these equations 
I calculated  demand  forecasts for 1983-85, using  two alternative  sets of 
assumptions  about  gross domestic product  and the own-currency  price 
37. The increased  foreign  exchange  value of the dollar  does not explain  much  of the 
1983-85  oil demand  sluggishness,  because it was offset by declining  dollar-denominated 
oil prices. In none of the six largest  OECD  countries  was the own-currency  price of oil 
higher  in 1985  than  in 1982  (figure  A-  1). 
38. I used the real U.S. price of imported  crude oil, converted to that country's 
currency,  using  that  year's  exchange  rate. 
39. For the United States, I used a cubic polynomial-distributed  lag because it had 
superior  results; see Dermot  Gately and Peter Rappoport,  "The Adjustment  of US Oil 
Demand to the Price Increases of the  1970's: Have the Conservation  Gains Been 
Overstated?"  (New York University, April 1986).  The price variable  was the refiners' 
acquisition  cost of crude oil, not the cost of imported  crude  oil. In the case of Japan,  a 
Koyck-lag  specification  yielded the wrong signs for price and income, so I also used a 
cubic  polynomial-distributed  lag. 
40. Estimating  the same equations  using three  additional  years' data (1983-85) does 
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of crude  oil: that the actual values for 1983-85 GDP and own-currency 
price had been known as of 1982  and that the 1983-85 own-currency 
price would be constant and the 1983-85 GDP growth rates would be 
the same  as those experienced  in the 1976-79  period  of moderately  high 
growth.4'  The summary  results  for all six countries  are  graphed  in figure 
Table 1.  OECD Oil Demand Equations, France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, 
Japan, and the United States, 1950-82a 
Independent 
variable and  United  United 
summary statistic  France  Germany  Italy  Kingdom  Japanb  Statesb 
Constant  -3.43  -  1.83  -6.14  -3.83  2.76  - 2.97 
(-2.21)  (-0.76)  (-3.32)  (-2.30)  (1.07)  (-4.61) 
Income  0.57  0.39  1.53  0.81  1.43  0.88 
(2.54)  (1.03)  (3.70)  (2.38)  (18.00)  (10.88) 
Price  -0.18  -0.20  -0.22  -0.15  -0.07  -0.05 
(-  5.36)  (-2.47)  (-4.75)  (-3.59)  (-2.63)  (-2.45) 
Demand,  lagged  0.75  0.80  0.36  0.72  ...  ... 
(6.85)  (6.23)  (2.18)  (6.24) 
First-order  autore- 
gressive term  -0.09  0.20  0.05  0.15  0.19  1.09 
(-0.42)  (0.94)  (0.20)  (0.67)  (0.87)  (-5.82) 
Second-order  auto- 
regressive  term  0.10  0.04  0.00  0.08  0.10  -0.32 
(0.55)  (0.21)  (0.01)  (0.34)  (0.66)  (-1.96) 
Summary statistic 
R2  0.994  0.991  0.993  0.984  0.993  0.996 
Standard  error  of 
regression  0.050  0.094  0.065  0.055  0.045  0.017 
Durbin-Watson 
statistic  2.09  2.06  1.94  1.75  2.42  2.42 
One-year  price 
elasticity  - 0.18  - 0.20  - 0.22  - 0.15  -0.07  - 0.05 
Long-run  price 
elasticity  - 0.72  -  1.00  -0.34  - 0.54  -  1.09  - 0.37 
Source: Author's  estimates.  See  equations  1, 2, and 3 in text. 
a.  Dependent  variable is total oil demand in each country.  The price measures are the real U.S.  price of imported 
crude oil,  converted  to that country's  currency,  using the exchange  rate for the corresponding  year. In all cases  but 
Japan and the United States the previous  year's demand is used as an explanatory variable. Numbers in parentheses 
are t-statistics. 
b.  For Japan and the United  States,  the lagged price coefficients  took  the form of a cubic polynomial-distributed 
lag of  ten  years.  For  other  countries,  a  Koyck  lag  was  used.  The  cubic  polynomial-distributed  lag  specification 
complicates  any comparisons  of the coefficients,  but the calculated  elasticities  are comparable. 
41. These  price  assumptions  are  reasonably  accurate  for France,  Italy,  and  the United 
Kingdom,  but  overstate  the price  for  Japan  and  Germany  and  especially  the United  States. 
The GDP growth assumptions  overstate growth by 40 percent for all but the United 
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13. (More detailed results for individual  countries are presented and 
discussed in the appendix.) With the actual values for 1983-85 own- 
currency  price  and  GDP  growth  rates, the demand  equations  would  have 
forecast the 1985  demand  level quite accurately. Slight overestimates 
for Germany,  Italy, and  the United Kingdom  would  have been offset by 
an underestimate  for Japan.  But with the assumption  of constant own- 
currency  price and higher (1976-79) economic growth rates, 1985 oil 
demand  would  have been overestimated  by about 1  million  bpd, or about 
3 percent of these countries' demand. The overestimate would have 
been the result  of lower-than-expected  economic  growth.42 
Thus the sluggish  oil market  in 1983-85 should not have been much 
of a surprise, although  it may have surprised  some OPEC producers 
hoping  for an oil demand  recovery similar  to that of 1975-78. Perhaps 
with  higher  eonomic  growth,  world  oil demand  could  have  been expected 
to be at most 1 or 2 million  bpd higher  by 1985,  and non-OPEC  supply 
might  have been expected to be 2 million  bpd lower. This 3 or 4 million 
Figure  13. Oil Demand  in Six OECD  Countries,  1962-85; Fitted  Values,  1962-82; and 
Forecasts,  1983-85a 
Millions  of 
barrels  per day  Forecast, 
35-  constant  price 
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Source:  DOE,  Annual Energy Review  1985, p. 239, and authors'  calculations.  See text description. 
a. The six OECD  countries  are France,  Germany,  Italy,  Japan,  the United  Kingdom,  and the United  States. 
42. If the actual  price  decline  had  been expected  in 1982,  then  the overestimate  would 
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bpd  shortfall  in demand  for  OPEC  oil was enough  to make  the difference, 
causing Saudi Arabian  production  to fall below 3 million bpd in the 
summer  of 1985,  precipitating  their  output  increases and the 1986  price 
collapse. 
From this I conclude that whenever the Saudis and their allies are 
"near  the edge," with very low capacity  utilization,  additional  setbacks 
could result in a repetition  of the sharp  price declines experienced in 
1986.  A serious recession in 1987  or sharp  increases in ouput  from Iran 
and Iraq  could return  OPEC  to its 1985  position, with the same internal 
conflict  and  risk  of price declines. 
The Outlook 
The July 1986  crude  oil price of $12 a barrel  was clearly  an overcor- 
rection of the 1973-74 and 1979-80 price increases and could not be 
sustained  long. With  oil at that price, Saudi  Arabia  and its allies would 
suffer revenue losses,  even at the increased production levels that 
precipitated  the price collapse. The Saudis  thus had every incentive to 
cut their  own output, even unilaterally.  The fact that they could get the 
rest of OPEC  to agree to cut back too made a price increase that much 
more  inevitable. 
Although  OPEC  will continue  to have difficulty  in getting  its mlembers 
to honor  their  output  quotas, it ought  to be easier than  it was in the past. 
With  the 1986  price collapse so fresh in mind, Saudi  threats  to increase 
output  once again  will have to be taken seriously. As Samuel  Johnson 
observed about the prospect of being hanged  in a fortnight,  the idea of 
$8 oil concentrates  the mind  wonderfully.  This 1986  price collapse and 
its "lessons" for the rest of OPEC  could well provide  the same type of 
folk memory  within OPEC  as did the 1930  experience of 10-cent  oil in 
East Texas for American  oilmen. 
But it is not  just OPEC's  painful  memory  of 1986  that  guarantees  that 
oil prices  will go up. There  have been no changes  in the world  oil market 
fundamental  enough  to sustain  an oil price  of $12  a barrel.  Although  non- 
OPEC  oil production  has increased  by more  than  50 percent  since 1973, 
it appears  to be within 10  percent  of its peak level. The world's proved 
oil reserves have not increased substantially, despite an enormous 
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changed.  Despite a great  deal of research  and  development,  there  is still 
no alternative  energy  source that  is cheap, clean, and  plentiful.  Perhaps 
the most encouraging  alternative  would be natural  gas. Oil's share of 
world energy use has declined, especially since 1978,  but it is still the 
world's  most important  fuel, comprising  40  percent  of the total  fuel  used. 
Prices of other  fuels increased  greatly  between 1973  and 1981  and have 
not declined  nearly  as much  as oil in the past five years. Oil  demand  has 
grown in the centrally planned economies and developing countries, 
even though  it has declined in the United States and in the rest of the 
OECD. The demand-reducing  adjustment  to the 1973-74 and 1979-80 
price increases has been decelerating and perhaps will be  entirely 
reversed by the 1983-86 price reductions. World  income growth will 
continue  to increase  the demand  for oil and  other  forms  of energy. 
Figure 14  projects  oil demand  growth  in the United States from 1985 
to 2000. The equations  underlying  the projections  are based on econo- 
metric  work  using  data  through  1985.43  Bothprojections  assume  3 percent 
annual  economic growth and price held constant at its 1985  level.44  In 
the "low-demand  specification"  a twenty-year  period  for adjustment  to 
past price increases  is assumed;  the estimated  income elasticity  is 0.77. 
In the "high-demand  specification" a ten-year adjustment  period is 
assumed;  the estimated  income elasticity is 1.0. The two specifications 
have basically  the same lagged-price  coefficients  for the first  ten years. 
The conclusion  to be drawn  is moderately  sobering:  unless one assumes 
that the period  of lagged  adjustment  is much longer  than ten years and 
that there is still to come a significant  lagged response to the 1973-74 
and 1979-80 price increases, there is not much  time series evidence for 
the optimistic  view that  demand  is highly  responsive  to price. 
How soon can we expect price to return  to the level of 1985  or 1980? 
Briefly,  when  market  conditions  and  OPEC  capacity  utilization  warrant. 
Price could return  to its 1985  level within  one to five years, to its 1980 
level within  five to ten years, perhaps  longer. Once non-OPEC  supply 
has  clearly  peaked,  price  can  be expected  to increase  much  more  rapidly. 
And with a major disruption,  price could rise to those levels within 
weeks. With oil prices, there is unavoidable  uncertainty,  the range of 
43. See Gately  and  Rappoport,  "The  Adjustment  of US Oil Demand." 
44. Taking  account  of the 1986  price decline would, of course, make demand  grow 
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which is well captured  in figure  7 above, with a little stretching  of the 
price distributions  downward. 
Assuming  that the demand  for OPEC oil increases to 22-24 million 
bpd within the next few years, how will OPEC respond?  In the 1990s, 
will it continue increasing  output above 25-27 bpd, or will it keep its 
output below that level and let price rise? I believe it will let output 
expand  up to about 30 million  bpd, which will be a practical  upper  limit 
for  OPEC.  Although  OPEC  has the oil reserves to support  a much  higher 
level of output,  perhaps  as high  as 45-50 million  bpd, it would  probably 
not be willing  to exhaust  its reserves that  rapidly.  Nor, probably,  would 
the OECD  countries,  if blessed with some  farsighted  political  leadership, 
be willing  to become as dependent  upon  OPEC  as they were in the 1970s. 
As Hall and Pindyck  have observed, the industrialized  world can have 
low prices  or energy  independence,  but not both.45 
Apart from a disruption, when price rises it will probably do so 
gradually.  Having  witnessed  the dangers  of major,  abrupt  price  increases 
Figure 14.  Oil Demand, 1970-85,  and Demand Projections to 2000, United Statesa 
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Source:  Dermot  Gately  and Peter  Rappoport,  "The  Adjustment  of U.S. Oil Demand  to the Price  Increases  of the 
1970's:  Have the Conservation  Gains  Been Overstated?"  (New York  University,  April 1986). 
a. GNP is assumed  to grow  at an annual  rate  of 3 percent,  and prices  are assumed  constant  at 1985  level. 
b. Ten-year  adjustment  to price  increases  and 1.0 income  elasticity. 
c. Twenty-year  adjustment  to price  increases  and  0.77 income  elasticity. 
45. Robert  E. Hall  and  Robert  S. Pindyck,  "The  Conflicting  Goals  of National  Energy 
Policy,"  The Public Interest,  vol. 47 (Spring 1977), pp. 3-15. 268  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1986 
since  1979-80,  Saudi Arabia and the rest of OPEC can be expected  to 
be much more cautious about raising price abruptly, to the degree that 
they do so intentionally rather than accidentally.  Such price fluctuations 
are in nobody's  interest: predictability and smoother price changes are 
preferable to uncertainty and abrupt changes.46 As I wrote in 1977, in an 
article about OPEC pricing strategies: 
One rule of thumb  [target-capacity-utilization]  pricing  strategy  that is likely to 
serve  OPEC  very  well for  the  foreseeable  future  . ..  is a strategy  that  is relatively 
cautious about further  major, abrupt  price increases. Such a strategy would 
increase price only gradually  when market  conditions warrant  and would cut 
price  aggressively  if necessary  to defend  OPEC's  market  position.47 
Abrupt price increases are, however,  possible  as soon as demand for 
OPEC oil recovers substantially enough to reach a level near production 
capacity. And unfortunately the West will be only slightly less vulnerable 
to such a disruption than it was in 1979-80.  Since  1973 there has been 
little  improvement  in short-run price-responsiveness,  apart from  in- 
creased  fuel-switching  capability  in electricity  generation.  Moreover, 
despite  a significant increase  in the U.S.  Strategic Petroleum Reserve 
under the Reagan administration, the reserve  is still only about half as 
large  as  originally  planned  for  1980,  despite  ample  opportunity  to 
purchase oil in a slack market. 
APPENDIX 
Oil Demand Forecasts for Six OECD Countries 
THIS APPENDIX details the  1982 forecasts  of 1983-85  oil demand for the 
United States, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Japan 
that were presented in aggregate form in figure 13. 
46. Of course, if the world's  reduced  dependence  on OPEC  is easily reversible  by a 
period  of lowered  prices, then a policy which "cycles" on price  could serve OPEC  quite 
well. OPEC  could  raise  price  abruptly  to take  advantage  of short-term  inelasticities,  then 
cut price sharply  when the lagged  response of world  oil demand  and non-OPEC  supply 
threatened  their  market.  This cycle could  be repeated  to OPEC's  benefit  (intentionally  or 
not)  as long as the world  had  a short  memory. 
47. Gately,  Kyle, and  Fischer, "Strategies  for OPEC's  Pricing  Decisions,  " p. 21  1. Dermot Gately  269 
Because of changes  in  foreign  exchange  rates, the dollar-denominated 
price of crude oil does not necessarily reflect the true cost of imported 
oil to other countries. As figure  A-1 shows, for France, Italy, and the 
United  Kingdom,  the 1981-85  decline  in the dollar  price  of oil was offset 
by an appreciating  dollar, so that their own-currency cost was un- 
changed.  In Japan  and Germany,  the cost declined  during  1981-85, but 
not by as much  as the cost in dollars.  The range  of 1970-85 increases in 
own-currency  cost of imported  oil is striking:  from a threefold  increase 
for Japan  and  Germany  to a tenfold  increase  for Italy. 
Oil demand  levels for the six countries  since 1970  are shown in figure 
A-2. During  1960-73, oil demand  increased  sharply:  by over 75 percent 
in the United States; more than twofold in the United Kingdom;  more 
than threefold  in France, Germany,  and Italy; and nearly sevenfold in 
Japan. Since 1973, however, the six countries have experienced sub- 
Figure A-1.  Own-Currency Price of Imported Crude Oil, Italy, United Kingdom, 
France, United States, Germany, and Japan,  1970-85 
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Sources:  Author's  calculations.  Price  from  DOE,  Annual Energy Review  1985, p.  135;  and  DOE, Monthly Energy 
Review, various  issues.  Converted  to own  currency  using  exchange  rates  from  Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation 
and Development,  National  Accounts  of  OECD  Countries,  1962-79,  1971-83,  and  OECD,  Quarterly  National 
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stantial  declines: 30 percent in the United Kingdom;  20-25 percent in 
France, Germany,  and Italy; 14  percent  in Japan;  and 10  percent  in the 
United States.48 
Table  A-I summarizes  the results  of the oil demand  forecasts  for each 
country. For France  and Germany,  oil demand  projections  for 1983-85 
would  have been on target  if the correct  assumptions  had  been made  for 
price and GDP, but there would have been about  a 10 percent  overesti- 
mate if the constant price and higher GDP growth rates had been 
assumed.49  For the United Kingdom  and for the United States, the two 
Figure A-2.  Oil Demand, Italy, United Kingdom, France, United States, Germany, 
and Japan,  1970-85 
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Source: Indexes  constructed  using data from DOE, Annual Energy Review 1985, p. 239; and DOE, Monthly Energy 
Review,  various issues. 
48. Within  the United States, when oil demand  is disaggregated  by product,  most of 
the decline  through  1985  has  been in residual  fuel, which  is used  by electric  utilities.  There 
have  been  much  smaller  declines  in distillates  (used  for  residential  space  heating)  and  other 
products.  Transportation  fuel demand  in 1985  (gasoline  and  jet fuel)  was almost  as high  as 
at its previous  peak  in 1978. 
49. For  Germany  I assume  that  the 1982  actual  level had  been used as the base for the 
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forecasts are basically the same and both are on target.50  But for Italy 
the forecasts are not nearly  as good: even with the correct  assumptions, 
demand  was overestimated  by more than 10 percent;  with the constant 
price and higher  GDP growth  rates, it would have been overestimated 
by over 30  percent.  For  Japan,  however,  the correct-assumption  forecast 
underestimated  the actual  demand,  while  the constant-price-and-higher- 
growth  forecast  was close to actual  demand. 
Table A-1.  1982 Forecasts of 1985 Demand Using Two Alternative Assumptions 
Millions  of barrels  per day 
Forecast  error 
Assuming  actual  Assuming  constant 
Actual  demand  price  and GDP  price  and higher 
Country  level  levelsa  GDPb 
France  1.82  + 0.02  +0.17 
Germany  2.35  +0.11  +0.22 
Italy  1.67  +0.22  +0.54 
United Kingdom  1.61  +0.10  +0.09 
Japan  4.34  -0.49  +0.14 
United States  15.70  -0.03  +0.02 
Total  27.49  -0.07  + 1.18 
Sources:  U.S.  Department  of  Energy,  Monthly  Energy Review,  various  issues,  and author's  forecast  using  the 
equations  presented  in table  1. 
a.  Assuming  that actual values  for 1983-85  and own-currency  price had been  known in 1982. 
b.  Assuming  that  1983-85  own-currency  price would  be constant  and that the  1983-85  GDP growth  rates would 
be the same as  1976-79 growth rates. 
50. For the United  Kingdom  the two sets of assumptions  are basically  the same. For 
the United  States, however, declining  oil prices and lower economic  growth  in 1983-85 
apparently  offset each other. Comments 
and Discussion 
M. A. Adelman: Almost  all energy  models, including  Dermot  Gately's, 
share a basic theory of mineral economics: a limited stock must be 
allocated over time to maximize its present value. It follows that the 
price, net of extraction cost, must rise continuously at the prevailing 
rate  of interest  in order  to compensate  the holders  and  prevent  arbitrage. 
Minerals  in the ground  are low-risk,  appreciating  assets. 
The depletion process is  strongly similar under competition and 
monopoly.  Either  way, the price  trajectory  is ever upward.  Under some 
plausible assumptions, the competitive and monopoly patterns are 
identical,  though  Gately  does not go that  far. 
Given the theory of mineral economics, the conclusions, both in 
Gately's  paper  and  in the work  of others, are  logical. The  pre-  1973  price, 
and, in turn,  the 1978  price, were unsustainably  low. But the impressive 
consensus  of an  everlasting  upcreep  of minerals  prices  is in really  striking 
contradiction  to the facts. Over time, and with few or no exceptions, 
minerals  prices have fallen, not risen. There is something  very wrong 
with a premise  of a fixed stock. 
I suggest  that  minerals  are  inexhaustible  or that  mineral  resources  are 
nonbinding  constraints.  We will never get to the end of the deposits of 
oil, gas, coal, and other  minerals.  We will stop extracting  any of them  if 
and when the investment needed to create new inventories (proved 
reserves) exceeds their expected value. How much will then be left in 
the ground  is unknowable  and  unimportant. 
The  economic  problem  is not  with  stocks  but  with  the  cost of providing 
flows: gross additions  to reserves. But the models ignore incremental 
costs. The  closest that  the Gately  paper  comes is in referring  to discovery 
size. In a given area  under  given conditions  of knowledge,  the odds are 
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that we find the biggest fields first, even by chance, because they are 
biggest. And we exploit the cheapest first. Life is one long slide from 
good to bad  and  from  bad  to worse. 
But diminishing  returns  have been offset, in fact more  than  offset, by 
increasing  knowledge.  Therefore,  the marginal  cost and  the competitive 
market  price of any mineral,  including  oil, is the uncertain  fluctuating 
resultant  of two strong  opposing  forces. 
If we think  in terms  of flows, not stocks, three consequences follow. 
First,  mineral  production  has at  least normal  risk.  Assets do not normally 
appreciate.  Second, if the 1973  pre-embargo  price, and  then, in turn,  the 
pre-1979  price, had  been unsustainably  low, we should  have seen a steep 
rise in marginal  investment  requirements  in the OPEC  countries  before 
1973  and  continuing  through  at least 1979.  We see nothing  of the kind. 
One might try to rescue the proposition  of increasing  scarcity and 
untenable  1973  prices by invoking  user cost, but user cost is simply  the 
present value of the resource used up in production.  Holding  the asset 
for future sale is an investment. Development  or exploration  are alter- 
native investments. Because they are all substitutes,  the cost of each is 
a proxy  for the others. Stable  development  costs, therefore,  mean  stable 
exploration  and  user cost. 
The third  consequence of thinking  in terms  of flows, not stocks, and 
of discarding  the false paradigm  of ever-rising  prices is that the family 
resemblance  between  price  and  production  trajectories  under  monopoly 
and  under  competition  disappears.  Inside  OPEC,  investment  has shrunk 
radically.  Outside  OPEC,  investment,  capacity, and  production  have all 
expanded.  Because supply  depends  on investment, any analysis whose 
key variable is percent of capacity utilized is, at most, of short-run 
significance.  I think  we ought  to look separately  at investment  in two or 
two and  one-half  sectors. 
First  the monopoly  sector, OPEC.  Huge resources  have been immo- 
bilized.  There  is enormous  pent-up  supply. My own calculations  show a 
competitive  floor of about $5. At that price, the cartel countries  could, 
within  a decade, build  up to over 60 million  bpd capacity  from  currently 
proved  reserves. They could stay there  for another  few years at least by 
expanding  reserves in only the fields known today. What  happens  after 
that, nobody  knows. The present value of a higher  or lower price, past 
the year 2000, is not important.  If the price stayed very low, say in the 
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The only way to save something  from the wreck of the cartel would be 
for each producer  to expand  output.  They would hate it, of course. And 
the fear of prices falling  to $5 may give them the energy of despair  and 
renew the cartel. 
Now consider  the noncartel  sector. They are at capacity, and Gately 
mentions  the relatively  brief "remaining  life" of reserves in the United 
States and  the North Sea. The United States in 1945  was more  drilled  up 
than  is any other country  today anywhere.  Remaining  reserves were 20 
billion barrels. There were few large fields to be found. Over the next 
forty years, not twenty but one hundred  billion barrels  were produced 
in the United States, excluding Alaska, with sixteen billion barrels 
remaining  at the end of 1985. Furthermore,  as far as I am aware, until 
1973,  there  was no increase  in real cost. 
This enormous  reserve addition  and depletion  was no gift of nature, 
nor  was it geologists' conservatism.  Investment  made  the existing  fields 
keep growing  as they were exploited, and  a great  many  small  fields  were 
discovered. So the notion of a country  being  at capacity  and doomed to 
run down in the future omits the most basic fact-the  inducement  to 
invest to create  reserves and capacity. 
Contrary  to Gately,  expenditures  outside  of OPEC  have created  large 
reserve  additions.  They have been  promptly,  which  is to say, efficiently, 
used up. But even outside the cartel, there  are many  areas  where higher 
prices have a tendency to reduce investment, lower prices to increase 
investment. 
Oil as an appreciating  asset is a fiction, but belief in the fiction is a 
fact. During  the 1970s,  the higher  the prices went, the higher  they were 
expected to go. Noncartel governments  thought  they could benefit by 
withholding  oil and  gas for future  production.  Governments,  therefore, 
demanded  impossible terms from foreign oil companies. Others over- 
taxed or explicitly restrained  production  and exports. When oil prices 
declined  after 1981,  many  reversed  course, and  production  rose. It was 
no accident. 
An outstanding  example  is Canada,  which  took a stunning  capital  loss 
of about  70 percent  on the value of the asset exportable  gas, which they 
are now promoting  at much  lower prices. The lesson is being  learned  all 
too slowly: government  take is a rent  and not a cost. 
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range of $18 to $22, is illusory. Costs, excluding  rents, are lower than 
that. Not even U.S. output would shrink  appreciably,  if at all. Output 
elsewhere  would  continue  to expand. 
Going  now  to the  cartel  nations:  because  they have  short  time  horizons 
and high discount rates, they gravitate toward a policy of "take the 
money and run." They are too quick  for their own good to raise prices 
and  too slow for their  own good to lower them. Relations  are dominated 
by larger  versus smaller. Small is beautiful.  The small members  cheat 
readily,  knowing  that the others will cover for them, but the buck stops 
with the largest. If he cheats, the agreement  collapses. But he cannot 
afford  to become everybody's favorite  patsy; hence, the endless game 
of chicken:  threats,  then action to make  the threats  good. 
History  repeats  itself, but  with  some significant  differences.  In  January 
1983  Saudi  Arabia  broke up an OPEC  meeting. Within  two months  the 
rest of the cartel  had  agreed  to quotas  to which they adhered  for a time. 
In November of  1985, the Saudis began to  sell their full quota by 
discounting  without  limit,  the so-called  netback  system. As in 1983,  they 
got their way, but this time it took nine months, many meetings, and a 
price  decline  of 50  percent.  The Saudis  did  gain  because  they had  almost 
nothing  to lose at the outset. One is tempted to say that another such 
victory  and  they are all finished,  but I think  not. 
Where  do we go from here? The cartel appears  to have a perceived 
ceiling that is in the neighborhood,  roughly,  of $25. If they can hold to 
the current  level, some halfway between $5 and $25, they will try for 
more. "Market  conditions" and OPEC "capacity utilization"  are not 
important.  Both times when prices exploded during the 1970s were 
periods  of slack demand,  except when production  was deliberately  cut 
to panic  the market.  Cohesion, or the lack thereof, is all-important. 
The cartel is trying to control prices by the control of output. But 
short-run  demand  and supply  are so inelastic  that small  output  changes 
can yield big price changes. Small  errors  have big results. But the cartel 
managers  do not even have current  data. Production  figures  are often 
falsified.  Consumption  numbers  lag  by months  in  the  industrial  countries, 
by years  in the less developed  countries.  Inventory  data  are shaky, even 
for the oil companies.  Consumer  stocks are a statistical  black  hole. 
In success and failure  alike, the cartel is clumsy and disruptive,  but 
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monopolized  and the rewards  thereof are immense, so they will keep 
trying.  I think  the  last  thing  we can  possibly  expect  is smooth  convergence 
to any supply-demand  equilibrium. 
James M. Griffin: Dermot  Gately's analysis  of the oil price collapse of 
1986  offers assuring  words to oil operators  and public  employees in the 
state of Texas. Take heart, OPEC  is not dead. Gately's price forecasts 
suggest  that the current  price debacle is temporary  and that by the year 
2000, oil prices will be in the $55-to-$60-a-barrel  range  (in 1985  dollars), 
an estimate that is similar  to his 1982  forecast, appearing  in the Energy 
Modeling Forum's survey of estimates of future oil prices.1 Further 
comfort  is provided  by William  W. Hogan  and  Paul  N. Leiby, who point 
out that at any time there exists a probability  distribution  of oil prices. 
Their  analysis would suggest the 1986  price collapse was simply  a low- 
probability event that nevertheless occurred. Their mean oil price 
forecast  for the year 2000  is almost  $70  a barrel.2 
I would summarize  Gately's paper  as follows. The oil price collapse 
of 1986  is simply  a large  negative  error  term,  causing  us to revise upward 
the equations' standard error; otherwise, the underlying structural 
equations  remain  statistically  valid, and the equations'  forecast of even 
loftier  peaks in oil prices in the distant  future  is still correct. 
Before some of my wildcatting  friends rush back into the oil patch 
and the Texas legislature relaxes upon learning that the state's $3.5 
billion  deficit  is only temporary,  perhaps  a bit more caution  is in order. 
My purpose  here is not to offer yet another  oil price forecast but simply 
to  examine the sensitivity of  these  conclusions to  key  underlying 
assumptions. 
The  conclusion  that  the current  price  decline  is a temporary  aberration 
rests on assumptions  about  the growth  of world  oil demand,  non-OPEC 
supply,  and  the behavioral  response  of the OPEC  cartel.  Let us consider 
each in turn. Gately's analysis suggests that the sharp  decline in world 
oil demand  in 1980-82  and  the stagnant  growth  thereafter  were basically 
the result  of lagged  adjustments  to oil price increases  of the 1970s.  Even 
though  modest world  gross domestic  product  growth  from 1981  to 1985 
1. Energy  Modeling  Forum, World  Oil, EMF Report  6, Summary  Report  (Stanford, 
Calif.:  EMF, February  1982). 
2. WilliamW.  Hoganand  Paul  N. Leiby, "RiskAnalysis  with  Energy  Security  Models" 
(Harvard  University,  John  F. Kennedy  School  of Government,  1985). Dermot Gately  277 
tended  to increase  oil demand,  lagged  price effects more  than  offset this 
tendency. With demand  having  fully adjusted  to the price increases of 
the 1970s,  a resumption  in oil demand  growth should  be evident in the 
late 1980s  and the 1990s  as world GDP expands and the effects of the 
real  price  decline since 1981  are  felt. While  one might  quibble  about  how 
robust this demand growth will be, depending  on long-run  price and 
income elasticities of demand, it seems clear that Gately's analysis is 
robust  to a variety  of plausible  ranges  for such elasticities. 
Gately's assumption  that non-OPEC  production  will soon peak and 
then begin to decline is plausible but subject to a good deal more 
uncertainty.  Even if prices remain  low, I am convinced that the shut-in 
of existing fields within the United States will not result in the large 
production  losses estimated  by various  industry  groups.3  Also, large  gas 
reserves  could enable  the Soviets to expand  oil exports  by 3 to 4 million 
barrels  a day  by substituting  natural  gas for oil domestically.  Particularly 
if oil prices stabilize  at $20 or more, Gately's conclusion  may not hold. 
Rather than belabor such issues, let us move on to a more critical 
assumption. 
With  either  constant  or declining  non-OPEC  production,  OPEC  will 
be the sole beneficiary  of a growing demand for oil. The behavioral 
assumption  I would like to examine more closely is how growth  in the 
demand  for OPEC  oil translates  into oil price increases. It was Gately, 
Kyle, and Fischer who first argued that OPEC is likely to eschew 
dynamic  wealth optimization  models in favor of "rule of thumb"  pric- 
ing.4  Because of its practicality,  most models followed their suggestion 
and  adapted  simple  price  adjustment  rules  based  on the  degree  of capacity 
utilization  facing  OPEC.  Price  determination  in both  Gately's  model  and 
in the Energy Information  Agency model used by Hogan and Leiby 
adopts  similar  adjustment  equations  tied to the ratio  of OPEC  production 
to capacity. This feature is also embedded in nine of the ten models 
surveyed in the Energy Modeling Forum's comparison of world oil 
models. For the EMF analysis, OPEC  capacity was held immutably  at 
34 million  bpd-roughly equal  to today's installed  capacity. In Gately's 
3. James M. Griffin  and Clifton  Jones, "Falling Oil Prices: Where is the Floor?" 
Energy Journal (forthcoming). 
4.  Dermot  Gately, John  Kyle, and Dietrich  Fischer, "Strategies  for OPEC's  Pricing 
Decisions,"  European  Economic  Review,  vol. 10  (November  1977),  pp. 209-30. 278  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1986 
latest simulations,  he projects  OPEC  capacity  at both  25 million  bpd  and 
35 million  bpd. 
With capacity assumed to be exogenously determined,  demand  for 
OPEC  oil rises to capacity,  and  prices  are  allowed  to increase  sufficiently 
to hold production  within this capacity constraint. The rate at which 
price then increases depends  on short-  and long-run  price elasticities of 
non-OPEC  supply,  demand,  and  the elasticity  of oil demand  with  respect 
to economic activity. Note that in Gately's figure 8, at one point or 
another  prices begin rising sharply,  ultimately  reaching  a $55-to-$60-a- 
barrel  price range  by the year 2000. Given the capacity constraint,  it is 
not surprising  that models uniformly  project  real oil prices far in excess 
of the 1980  price  peak. 
It would seem that  the most critical  determinant  of future  oil prices is 
the exogenously determined  OPEC capacity limits. Yet, little if any 
justification  is given for such limits. In the EMF survey, 34 million  bpd 
was chosen as capacity presumably because it coincided with 1981 
installed  capacity. But productive  capacity has nothing  to do with the 
constraints  imposed by the underlying  resource base. Known reserves 
in most OPEC countries would permit production rates many times 
current  installed  capacity:  all  that  is needed  is additional  wells, pipelines, 
and loading terminals. In most OPEC countries, installed capacity is 
readily expandable  because of the high potential production  rates of 
individual  wells. Morris  Adelman  has shown that at a marginal  cost of 
$5 a barrel,  OPEC  could expand  productive  capacity to 60 million  bpd 
based entirely on known reserves.S Because estimates of potential 
undiscovered  reserves in these countries are quite large, such a rate 
could probably  be sustained  for a substantial  period. 
If current  capacity in OPEC  countries  is not effectively constrained 
by the magnitude  of the resource base, by technical limitations,  or by 
costs  of  capacity expansion, then OPEC decisionmakers are truly 
unconstrained  in their capacity choice. But if this is true, why should 
they choose to maintain  productive  capacity  at 1970  levels? Admittedly, 
installed OPEC capacity has not changed appreciably  over the past 
fifteen years, but is  this sufficient justification for holding it fixed 
immutably  for the next fifteen  years?  One could argue  that  over the past 
5. M. A. Adelman, "The Competitive  Floor to World  Oil Prices," Energy  Journal 
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fifteen  years, OPEC  countries  had  little  reason  to expand  capacity.  When 
production  approached  capacity, as in the late 1970s, OPEC countries 
simply raised prices instead of expanding  capacity. At the time, there 
was little fear of driving  price too high. Since then, falling  demand  has 
left OPEC production at only a fraction of capacity, providing  little 
reason for expansion. But in the future as resumed demand growth 
pushes  production  up against  existing  capacity,  will OPEC  again  choose 
to raise price rather  than capacity as implied  by the models of Gately 
and  others?  This amounts  to assuming  that  the OPEC  cartel  will change 
very little both in membership  and  in behavioral  characteristics. 
I find such an assumption highly implausible. My own research 
indicates that OPEC is a partial market-sharing  cartel rather than a 
dominant-firm  type cartel  in which one member,  Saudi  Arabia,  or a few 
producers  act as the residual  supplier  and  other  OPEC  members  behave 
competitively.6  With  the exception  of Iraq,  Gabon,  and  Ecuador,  OPEC 
members  tend  to raise  and  lower  productionjointly,  with some members 
absorbing  larger  percentage  production  cuts than others. Because mar- 
ket-sharing  behavior  is the weakest type of cartel  arrangement,  the past 
may be little guide for the future. There are several reasons to expect 
intra-OPEC  dissension. 
First, the legitimacy of a cartel member's market  share is likely to 
become blurred,  especially after upheavals such as the Iran-Iraq  war, 
the cessation of which  will require  a major  reallocation  of market  shares 
if Iran  and  particularly  Iraq,  as is likely, expand  production  significantly. 
Second, long-term  interests  among  OPEC  countries  are  varied.  Small 
producers  tend  to prefer  competitive  behavior;  those with  huge  resource 
bases  prefer  a low price-high  output  strategy.  For  example,  many  OPEC 
observers,  including  Gately, interpret  the production  increases  by Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates  in 1986  as a means of 
reducing  price and disciplining  cheaters within  the cartel. As shown in 
my table 1, OPEC members have not shared equally in the drop in 
demand  for  OPEC  crude  following  the 1979-80  price  increases.  Although 
statistical  tests reject  pooling  of OPEC  countries  into behavioral  group- 
ings, it is  often useful to  think of  OPEC as  consisting of  Output 
Maximizers,  Price  Maximizers,  and  the Cartel  Core.7  As the table  shows, 
6. James  M. Griffin,  "OPEC  Behavior:  A Test of Alternative  Hypotheses,  " American 
Economic Review, vol. 75 (December  1985), pp. 954-63. 
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the Core has borne the brunt  of the production  cutbacks. Comparing 
1980  and 1985  production  rates, we note that Ecuador  and Gabon  (both 
Output  Maximizers)  showed no tendency for restraint,  while Nigeria, 
Indonesia, and Venezuela cut production  by roughly  20 to 25 percent. 
The production  changes  in Iraq  and  Iran  are largely  determined  by war- 
related factors. Algeria, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Libya 
cut production  by about 40 percent, while Core members  Kuwait and 
Saudi  Arabia  reduced  output  by 50  percent  and  68 percent,  respectively. 
The smaller  countries  in OPEC  have no doubt  learned  the benefits  of 
making  only marginal  production  cutbacks.  Conversely,  producers  with 
huge  reserve  bases and  relatively  low production  have no doubt  realized 
that although  the doubling  of price in 1979-80 may have optimized  the 
wealth of small OPEC  producers,  it did not optimize  their  own wealth. 
The  quarterly  production  data  in table 1 show that  beginning  in the  fourth 
Table 1.  Quarterly OPEC Production, 1980:1-86:2 
Millions of barrels a day unless  otherwise  indicated 
1980  1981  1982 
Country  1  2  3  4  1  2  3  4  1  2  3  4 
Output Maximizers 
Iraq  3.4  3.3  3.1  0.3  0.8  1.0  1.1  1.1  1.5  0.8  0.8  0.8 
Nigeria  2.2  2.1  1.9  2.0  1.9  1.4  0.9  1.6  1.4  1.3  1.2  1.4 
Indonesia  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.5  1.3  1.3  1.4 
Ecuador  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2 
Gabon  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2 
Total  7.6  7.4  7.0  4.3  4.7  4.4  4.0  4.7  4.8  3.8  3.7  4.0 
Price Maximizers 
Iran  2.4  1.8  1.6  0.9  1.7  1.6  1.2  1.0  1.4  2.3  2.3  2.6 
Algeria  1.2  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  0.9  0.6  0.8  0.7  0.6  0.7  0.8 
Venezuela  2.2  2.1  2.2  2.3  2.2  2.1  1.9  2.2  1.9  1.5  1.9  2.3 
Total  5.8  4.9  4.8  4.2  4.9  4.6  3.7  4.0  4.0  4.4  4.9  5.7 
Cartel Core 
Saudi Arabia  9.8  9.8  9.8  10.3  10.2  10.2  9.9  9.0  8.1  6.4  5.9  5.4 
Kuwait  2.2  1.6  1.4  1.6  1.6  1.0  1.0  0.9  0.8  0.8  0.9  0.9 
Qatar  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.3 
UAE  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.1  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.4  1.4  1.2  1.2  1.2 
Libya  2.1  1.7  1.7  1.7  1.6  1.4  0.7  0.9  0.7  0.8  1.3  1.7 
Total  16.6  15.6  15.4  16.2  15.4  14.5  13.5  12.6  11.4  9.5  9.6  9.5 
Total OPEC  30.0  27.9  27.2  24.7  25.0  23.5  21.2  21.3  20.2  17.7  18.2  19.2 
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quarter  of 1985,  Saudi  Arabia  and  other  members  of the Core, excluding 
Libya,  attempted  to regain  a market  share  merely  in line  with  their  earlier 
experience. The result was of course the price collapse of 1986. The 
Core  countries  were acutely aware  that  at the very low production  rates 
of 1985,  the present  value of their  vast reserves was greatly  diminished. 
I disagree  with Gately's conclusion that for price below $12, output 
reductions  by Saudi  Arabia  and  other  Core  members  would  be irrational. 
Gately's claim is that with price above $12 even the Saudis face an 
inelastic  short-run  demand  and  have incentives  to cut production  unilat- 
erally, while with lower prices they lose revenue by cutting output 
further.  But his conclusion overlooks both the game-theoretic  aspect 
and the long-run  elasticity of demand implications  behind the Saudi 
strategy.  To the contrary,  I would argue  that barring  military  interven- 
tion, the Saudi  ploy was a no-lose gambit.  If the price  drop  succeeded in 
Table 1.  (continued) 
1983  1984  1985  1986  Percent 
change, 
1  2  3  4  1  2  3  4  1  2  3  4  1  2  1980-85 
0.8  1.0  1.0  1.1  1.1  1.2  1.3  1.3  1.3  1.3  1.5  1.7  1.7  1.7  -42.6 
0.8  1.4  1.4  1.3  1.5  1.3  1.2  1.6  1.6  1.4  1.3  1.7  1.4  1.6  -  26.8 
1.1  1.4  1.4  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.4  1.4  1.3  1.2  1.3  1.3  1.3  1.4  -  20.3 
0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  + 50.0 
0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.0 
3.1  4.2  4.2  4.3  4.5  4.5  4.4  4.8  4.7  4.4  4.6  5.2  4.9  5.2  -  28.7 
2.5  2.3  2.7  2.4  2.3  2.0  2.0  2.3  2.1  2.2  2.4  2.3  2.0  2.1  + 34.3 
0.6  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.6  0.7  0.7  0.6  0.7  0.6  0.6  0.7  0.6  0.6  -  38.1 
2.0  1.7  1.7  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.7  1.7  1.7  1.7  1.7  1.7  -  22.7 
5.1  4.7  5.1  4.9  4.7  4.5  4.5  4.7  4.5  4.5  4.7  4.7  4.3  4.4  -  6.6 
4.0  4.2  5.6  5.7  4.8  5.0  4.3  3.7  3.6  2.7  2.5  4.1  4.3  4.7  -  67.5 
0.8  0.7  1.0  1.1  1.0  0.9  0.9  0.8  0.9  0.8  0.8  0.9  1.2  1.4  -  50.0 
0.2  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.3  -40.0 
1.1  1.2  1.2  1.2  1.2  1.2  1.1  1.1  1.2  1.2  1.2  1.2  1.3  1.5  -40.7 
1.0  1.1  1.2  1.2  1.1  1.2  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.2  1.0  1.1  -41.6 
7.1  7.5  9.3  9.6  8.5  8.7  7.7  6.9  7.0  6.0  5.8  7.7  8.2  9.0 
15.3  16.4  18.6  18.8  17.7  17.7  16.6  16.4  16.2  14.9  15.1  17.6  17.4  18.6  -41.8 282  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1986 
eliminating  cheating  and  reining  in OPEC  production,  price  could  return 
to previous  levels and enable Saudi  Arabia  and other  Core  producers  to 
increase previous production  rates. If the price drop failed to restore 
cartel discipline, price would remain  relatively low and the Core, the 
holders  of vast low-cost reserves, would be the primary  beneficiaries  of 
rapid  demand  growth  in future  years as a consequence of lower prices. 
In this latter scenario, it is easy to envision expansion of productive 
capacity to 20 million bpd in Saudi Arabia, another 7 million bpd in 
Kuwait,  6 million  bpd  in United  Arab  Emirates,  and  so on. With  capacity 
expansions of this magnitude  together  with those in other OPEC  coun- 
tries, notably  Iraq, it is possible to envision OPEC  capacity of 40 or 50 
million  bpd. Under such a scenario, the sharp  price increases to $55 to 
$60  a barrel  (in 1985  dollars)  by 2000  would not be sustainable. 
All  of this  suggests  that  economic  modeling  approaches  that  arbitrarily 
set OPEC  capacity  are begging  the question. Capacity  expansions  must 
be endogenized, and once they are, the results are likely to be quite 
sensitive to the factors  determining  capacity  expansions. 
Furthermore, much more attention must be  given the changing 
behavioral  responses within  OPEC.  The experience of the 1981  to 1986 
period has underscored the considerable heterogeneity of interests 
among OPEC producers. Henry Steele likens OPEC to "an extended 
polygamous  family . ..  containing  able patriarchs,  propertied  wives, a 
shrewd uncle or two, and a sprinkling  of indolent brothers-in-law  and 
other arrogant,  elegant idlers."8 Since relations in such a family are 
likely  to be tumultuous,  varying  periodically  from  raptures  to internecine 
warfare, I suspect that OPEC will continue to confound economic 
modelers. 
General  Discussion 
Robert  Pindyck  suggested  that the large  drop  in spot oil prices in the 
first  half  of 1986  could not be explained  as simply  the result  of increased 
output  by the Core  group  of OPEC  producers.  From 1979  to 1981,  OPEC 
output decreased by 8 million bpd, largely as a result of the Iranian 
revolution  and  the Iran-Iraq  war. At the same time, there  was a massive 
sustained  increase  in worldwide  inventories.  As a consequence of both 
8. James  M. Griffin  and  H. B. Steele, Energy  Economics  andPolicy, 2d  ed. (Academic 
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these developments,  prices rose from  $14 to $32  a barrel.  In light  of this 
experience, he found  it implausible  that  the nearly  3 million  bpd  increase 
in Core output  during  the first half of 1986  could have caused prices to 
decline  from  $28  to $14. For one thing,  Pindyck  noted, the $28  spot  price 
at the end of 1985  is not a good benchmark  from which to analyze the 
decline in prices. A better  benchmark  would be the December 1985  six- 
months-ahead  futures  price  of $23. He interpreted  the unusual  excess of 
spot  prices  over  futures  prices  at that  time  as reflecting  large  convenience 
yields on holding  inventories  given relatively  low inventory  levels and 
the oncoming  winter. But he reasoned that even a decline from $23 to 
$14  cannot  be accounted  for by  just the Core  group  production  increase 
of 3 million  bpd. He cited three other causes of the oil price decline: an 
unusually  warm  winter  in North America, lower-than-expected  world- 
wide GNP growth, and greater-than-expected  declines in LDC energy 
consumption. 
William  Nordhaus  observed that one clear message of the paper  and 
discussion was the importance of market structure assumptions for 
predicting  the  oil  price  path.  The  competitive  price  suggested  by Adelman 
was somewhere  in the range  of $5 to $10 a barrel.  A price between $10 
and $20 might be the present-value maximizing price for the Core 
producers.  And  if the oil-producing  countries  simply  pick  a fixed  quantity 
of output as appropriate,  prices could be much higher. In considering 
future  prices, Nordhaus  argued  the need to stress the inherent  indeter- 
minacy  of oil prices  in the medium  run;  they could  be anywhere  between 
$5  and  $100  by the  mid-  1990s.  That  indeterminacy  reflects  the  uncertainty 
about  what market  structure  will prevail, together  with very low short- 
run demand and non-OPEC supply elasticities. Nordhaus concluded 
that we should  expect tremendous  volatility  in oil prices in the coming 
years. In his view,  the confidence band attached to most oil price 
projections  is far too narrow. 
Charles Holt suggested that institutional  analysis of the actors in- 
volved in the oil market  might  yield better  price  projections  than supply 
and  demand  analysis. Nordhaus  added  that some of the best analyses of 
the oil market  during  the 1970s  and early 1980s  were done by the CIA's 
Middle  East experts. 
Glenn  Hubbard  noted that  while horizontal  market  structure  is key to 
long-run  price determination,  vertical  market  structure  has a significant 
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from  reliance  on vertical  integration  and  long-term  contracts  to reliance 
on short-term  contracts and spot-market  transactions. An active oil 
futures market  has also developed. As a result, forecasts of short-run 
price paths now ought to take full account of the prices in futures 
markets. Philip Verleger  estimated that spot trade currently  accounts 
for between 50 and 75 percent of daily oil consumption,  substantially 
eliminating  arbitrage  between  markets.  European  and  U. S. markets  used 
to follow each other closely,  but at one point last year, Verleger 
continued,  Arab  light  oil was selling  for $12 on the U.S. Gulf  Coast and 
for $20  in Europe. Given high  transportation  costs, local price volatility 
attributable  to  short-run  discrepancies in supply availability across 
markets  will continue,  absent  changes  in market  structure. 